**Season 17  
—  
Debating the 2016-2017 NCFCA Policy Resolution**

The following articles and worksheets correlate with Unit IV of Monument Publishing’s *Blue Book for Policy Debate*. Study this resource much like you studied the model resolutions in Unit III. Become incredible learners of the year’s policy debate resolution, this addendum being your initial launch into the debate season. Good luck!

**“Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially reform its policies toward the People’s Republic of China.”**

**Table of Contents**

History of US Foreign Policy with China 2

Early History 3

From Prosperity to Collapse 4

From Communism to Something Else 6

US-China Relations After World War II 7

Special Notes About Taiwan 11

Worksheet: History of US Foreign Policy with China 13

Answers 15

*Content collected and much of it written by Vance Trefethen. Some parts of this work were extracted from an article on China written for a previous Blue Book by K. Goddu. Chris Jeub wrote the worksheets at the end of the essay.*

History of US Foreign Policy with China



NCFCA’s 2016-2017 Policy Resolution:

“*Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially reform its policies toward the People’s Republic of China.*”

This year’s resolution calls our attention to United States foreign policy toward the People’s Republic of China. It’s a topic that is often in the news and has substantial impact on our country’s trade and national security, as well as impacting other countries in the region. China matters because almost every significant world problem requires the participation of China to solve:

“The evolution of Sino­US relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US­China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable US alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of US and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of US­China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without US­China cooperation.”[[1]](#footnote-2)

You may or may not have pre-existing beliefs about the topic. If you do, I strongly urge you to do what every debater should do every year: Learn the history, the arguments, and the evidence from all sides of every issue equally. Remember that in policy debate, your position is assigned to you at the start of the round. If you’re Affirmative, you can pick what you want to talk about and advocate for. But if you’re Negative (which you will be 50% of the time), you do not get to pick. You must simply oppose whatever the Affirmative is arguing, even if they are arguing for things you personally agree with. That means you have to understand and be able to argue for policies that you may be opposed to. That’s a feature, not a defect, in team policy debate. You will find your mind and horizons greatly broadened. And you never know: You just might change your mind about some things after hearing and debating both sides.

Early History

American civilization’s existence probably owes much of its origin to European trade policy with East Asia. After the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, land trade routes from Western Europe to Asia were either blocked or became too expensive or dangerous. But trade with India, China and Japan was a siren call that Europeans could not resist. Great wealth awaited anyone who could go to the East and bring back the luxury goods (e.g. spices, silk, tea, porcelain) that rich Westerners craved.

The world economy was much different then. Western Europe was a poor rural region without much to recommend it to observers guessing the future course of world history. The East was wealthy and the West was poor. Intelligent observers of that day would have expected India and China, centers of wealth, trade, civilization, and urbanization,[[2]](#footnote-3) to lead the world in the coming generations. But it was not to be.

Western European governments realized the vast potential for wealth for whomever developed an efficient sea trade route with India, Japan and China. Explorers hoping to become rich and famous while converting heathens to the Catholic faith were willing to take the risks demanded by their sovereigns. Europeans accidentally stumbled across two large continents blocking the intended western route to Asia, but it all worked out in the end, at least for Europeans. The technologies needed for building and operating large navies that could navigate far from land and cross vast oceans on dangerous missions allowed Europeans to take the lead in world trade and, ultimately, colonial domination.

China, meanwhile, turned inward. In the early 1400s, China had the biggest fleet of ships the world had ever seen, and was conducting peaceful trade and naval patrols throughout east and south Asia, even into the Middle East and east Africa. And although some degree of trade continued, China dramatically reversed course in the 1430s, when a new Emperor took power and ended such naval activities. China withdrew upon itself, just as Europe was about to globalize. By 1500 the Chinese navy ceased to exist.[[3]](#footnote-4) The confluence of these two events affect world history even today.

From Prosperity to Collapse

China prospered in the 1700s as “the center of the world economy,”[[4]](#footnote-5) profiting immensely by the trade in its luxury goods in exchange for silver from Europeans. Alarmed at the trade imbalance involving a constant outflow of their money to China (this will be a recurring theme), Europeans came up with something else to trade instead of silver: opium. Its intoxicating and addictive qualities made it popular with many of the common folk, but outraged the rulers as they saw the social destruction it was causing. The Chinese government tried to ban the drug, but were forced by British military might in 1839 to give in to their demands.

Thus began what Chinese refer to as the “Century of Humiliation.” Although the nation was never fully colonized or annexed by any European power, China was carved up into spheres of influence, and even direct foreign control in some cities, as Westerners forced their way in to take control of China’s trade. China had gone from the most powerful and prosperous nation in the world to a weak nation impoverished and humiliated by outsiders. In China’s modern-day view, it would not begin to emerge from its humiliation until the Communist revolution in 1949.

Not only was China humiliated by European powers, it was directly colonized by Japan. Japan’s first significant extra-territorial efforts were the colonization of Taiwan and Korea in the 1890s. Their rule was rigorous and often brutal; possibly its only redeeming feature was that it led to a rapid increase in the industrialization of the colonies (for the enrichment of Japan itself, of course).[[5]](#footnote-6) It went on to occupy large parts of China and other parts of East Asia in the decades that followed. Japanese colonial rule ended with its surrender at the end of World War II in 1945. But the memories of its brutality and aggression continue to haunt relations between Japan and the nations it occupied during those troubled years.

The US had a mixed relationship with China during the 1800s, enacting some policies that were helpful and friendly toward China, while others were hostile and even hateful. China’s biggest concern in the 1800s was the steady encroachment upon its sovereignty by European colonial powers, who wanted to take control of China’s trade for their own profit. The US opposed such European encroachment, and US opposition helped maintain the integrity of China as a nation during this time.[[6]](#footnote-7) US opposition to Japanese colonization created frictions that ultimately led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and to substantial US cooperation with China while fighting Japan together during World War II.

But the US also had policies that could be described as hostile toward China. Beginning in 1854, the US Navy started armed gunboat patrols on China’s Yangtze River, to protect American commercial interests.[[7]](#footnote-8) The first federal law restricting immigration was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. And in 1899, US Marines participated in combat in Beijing to defend Westerners against an armed anti-foreign movement among the Chinese that was not being effectively suppressed by the Chinese government.[[8]](#footnote-9)

The ancient Chinese imperial monarchy collapsed in 1911 under strains and problems too numerous to detail in this work. Various factions attempted to reunify the nation, including the Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist, movement. The KMT at that time was led by Chiang Kai-shek, and his movement included a broad ideological mix of followers, many of whom found they could not continue to coexist due to the magnitude of their differences. In April, 1927, Chiang determined that those of the KMT who were of the persuasion that Communism was the way forward (having seen the recent successes of the Communist revolution in Russia a few years earlier) were a threat to the nation, and he kicked them out of the KMT.

These expelled militants formed the Communist Party and began a slow guerilla campaign to win the hearts and minds (and territory) of the Chinese countryside away from the KMT and other rivals. Direction of the Party was eventually consolidated in the hands of the charismatic leader Mao Zedong (better known to history as “Chairman Mao,” in his role as chairman of the Communist Party), who gained a mass following by promising land reform and farms for the hungry and oppressed peasants who enlisted in his cause. The Communists revolted against the KMT, began a popular movement of their own, and civil war broke out.

In 1936, the two sides suspended (or at least declared their intention to suspend) their hostilities in order to focus on the outside threat that had arrived: the Japanese invasion. Both sides fought the Japanese (and each other to a lesser degree) until Japan surrendered in 1945.

From Communism to Something Else

After World War II ended, China’s civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists (also known as the Kuomintang or KMT), which had been on hold as they fought the common Japanese enemy, resumed again. The Communists drove the KMT from power and forced their evacuation offshore to the island of Formosa, better known as Taiwan. The KMT continued to maintain its position that it was the sole legitimate government of all of China, but as the decades passed with the KMT controlling only a small island with a tiny percentage of the people, that view became more and more untenable. More about Taiwan below in a separate section.

Chairman Mao set about to build a People’s Republic of China that would restore his people’s dignity and economy by importing the western philosophy of communism, but with his own doctrinal spin. While Western communists (as in Russia, for example) had focused on urban industrialization, Mao believed that organizing the rural farmers and peasants was the way forward. They had, after all, been the backbone of his support and he had ridden on their shoulders to victory in the civil war.

Although the Communists were able in some ways to improve the lot of the rural poor by eliminating the excesses and corruption of the old regime’s rulers,[[9]](#footnote-10) Mao’s blueprint for rural development did not lead to a modern functioning economy. As in other nations that have tried to follow the communist doctrine of government central planning of a nation’s economy, communism in China failed to ignite rapid economic development for China’s masses. In 1974, two years before Mao’s death, China’s per capita gross national product was only $300 per year, compared with $810 per year in Taiwan and $6,670 in the U.S.[[10]](#footnote-11)

Things changed after Mao’s death. Though the Communist Party still holds a monopoly on political power, they have discarded many of the doctrines that made them “communist” in the first place. Starting in 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China began opening up to foreign trade and private enterprise, slowly abandoning the strict tenets of communism. Deng’s famous explanation to justify his changes to communist orthodoxy was: "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice.”[[11]](#footnote-12) China no longer worries too much about Communist orthodoxy – all that matters is economic growth.

Though none dare call it capitalism, Deng’s reforms, and their continuation by his successors, have paid off richly for the people of China. Though still without democratic political representation, and denied many important human rights, the Chinese people have seen a rapid growth in their economic well-being. Per capita GDP in China in 2013 was about $6,800, compared with about $53,000 in the United States.[[12]](#footnote-13) Note the development: In the 1974 figures cited above, China’s ratio of per capita GDP to the US was 1/22 – in other words, we could estimate that the average American was 22 times richer than the average Chinese in the 1970s. Today it’s 1/6. While still poor compared to the average American, the average Chinese citizen is far better off than he was a generation ago.

US-China Relations After World War II

Since the fall of the Nationalist government in 1949 and their escape to the island of Taiwan, America and the PRC remained hostile for the next two decades, including open warfare from 1951-1953 when China sent troops across its border with North Korea to intervene against the US in the Korean War. This had the unintended consequence of pushing the United States and Taiwan closer together. The non-communist dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek moved within the circles of the American foreign policy of “containment” – the doctrine that declared US foreign policy should be directed at limiting the spread of communism and “containing” it within countries that were already communist. This prompted American General Douglas MacArthur to comment Taiwan’s military importance as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.”[[13]](#footnote-14)

Chairman Mao wanted to challenge the effectiveness of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, a written agreement between the US and Taiwan that came into effect in 1955.[[14]](#footnote-15) Mao tested the American resolve by bombarding the Taiwanese-owned Quemoy and Matzu islands in August 1958, but he underestimated the U.S. response. Mao believed the Americans would do nothing or little and he would be free to promote a more aggressive agenda. He expected that if the U.S. reacted forcefully, the Soviet Union would side with the PRC.[[15]](#footnote-16)

The American response was not only swift but forceful. President Eisenhower ordered six aircraft carriers with atomic weapons into the region. He ordered eight-inch artillery deployed on Taiwan with the capabilities of firing tactical nuclear warheads. The United States was prepared to use more force if necessary. Mao commented later, “I simply did not calculate that the world would become disturbed and turbulent . . . . Who would have thought when we fired a few shots at Quemoy and Matzu that it would stir up such an earth-shattering storm?” The crisis abated when the Soviet Union forced China to back down.[[16]](#footnote-17)

In the end, Mao’s gamble failed. Facing the threat of escalation to nuclear war, the Soviet Union forced China to stand down from the conflict with the United States. It was the beginning of the schism between the two giant communist nations, leading to abandonment of their alliance of like-minded communist ideological governments.

The uneasy peace in the Taiwan Straits remained for the next fourteen years as the United States Navy continued its patrols defending the other “China.”[[17]](#footnote-18) The United States continued to recognize the government on Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China.

But in 1972, the unexpected happened. Pres. Richard Nixon, the staunch anti-communist crusader, did what only he could do: open relations with the People’s Republic of China. Nixon, who had formerly used the anti-communist rhetorical label “Red China” for the PRC, gingerly shook Mao’s hand in. The meeting between the two national leaders was significant because the U.S. and the PRC had no diplomatic relations. Nixon ended regular naval patrols in the Taiwan Straits and lifted trade and visitation restrictions.[[18]](#footnote-19)

In the game of diplomatic chess, Taiwan became the pawn the U.S. was willing to sacrifice in order to achieve victory. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor, told China’s Premier Zhou En-lai that the United States did not seek “a two-Chinas, one-China, or one-Taiwan, nor an independent Taiwan.” However, Nixon made it clear that any attempt to reunite Taiwan with China would be met with opposition.

President Carter took the next big step in US-PRC relations in 1979 by signing an official statement establishing normal diplomatic relations with the PRC, recognizing it as the government of China, and declaring that “the Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”[[19]](#footnote-20) Carter terminated official recognition and diplomatic relations with Taiwan, though he maintained contacts between the US government and Taiwan at an unofficial level.

Perhaps it was inevitable that the government that ruled over 99% of the Chinese people should have been recognized as the legitimate government of China. But eager not to be seen as abandoning an old friend, Congress responded the same year with the Taiwan Relations Act, to try to restore some measure of US support for Taiwan.

Things went downhill in the years immediately following the establishment of relations in 1979, however, over the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan. Hoping to rescue the US relationship with the PRC, President Ronald Reagan signed a communiqué in 1982 giving assurances to the PRC about US intentions to phase out those arms sales. Those assurances have largely not been honored, and the US continues to periodically announce the approval of arms sales to Taiwan, which are always met with dismay and anger from Beijing.

By the end of 1986, movements demanding democracy occurred throughout the nation. The Communist Party was divided between radical and conservative members over tempo and pace of the newly ordained reform policies. In April 1989, public opposition mounted toward the national government for more openness in the government. Massive demonstrations were held daily at Tiananmen Square in Beijing calling for democracy. Martial law was proclaimed as protests continued. Finally, on June 4, military personnel occupied Tiananmen Square and fired on the crowd.

After Deng’s death in 1997, China continued on the path of expanding capitalism while still being governed by a party that calls itself communist. China today appears to be moving confidently out of the shame of its “Century of Humiliation” due to advancements in both economics and international diplomacy. China’s rising standard of living, brought on by greater economic openness and international trade, is engaging Chinese citizens globally like never before. And the return to Chinese sovereignty of the former British colony city of Hong Kong (1997) and the Portuguese city of Macau (1999) helped reverse the vestiges of past European humiliation.

The opening of China’s economy, as they moved away from a closed communist system in the 1970s to the entrepreneurial international capitalist giant they have become today, has had seismic implications for the global economy. Today trade with China is a big part of the US economy, and much of the US national debt is held in Chinese hands. While trade creates opportunities, lowers prices and raises many of China’s peasants out of poverty, it also creates controversy as many in the US blame China for lost manufacturing jobs and weaker economic conditions in the US.

China is also in a precarious position with the US in terms of military competition (or military “threat”). The 2001 crash between a Chinese military aircraft and a US military plane off the Chinese coast was a flash point for both sides. China wondered why US planes were conducting surveillance flights along their coastline in areas considered restricted under Chinese law. Americans wondered why the Chinese pilot crashed into the US plane, and why the flight crew was held captive for 10 days after an emergency landing on Chinese soil.

But the bigger issues are about China’s capabilities and intentions for the ongoing expansion, technological upgrades and spheres of operation for its military. Though still technologically backwards compared to the US, China has nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and they are actively seeking to upgrade the weapons systems used by their armed forces. As China’s economy expands, they will have more money to devote to military modernization. China’s navy is expanding and asserting control over questionable zones of what were formerly uncontested international waters. Will these be powers be used for defensive purposes? Will they be used to reunite the last missing piece of China – Taiwan – with the mainland? Or will they be used to increase China’s influence and presence in Asia through military means or threats? Today, no one knows.

Special Notes About Taiwan

You will probably see cases involving Taiwan, either directly or indirectly, so you need at least some background information about it. Whether Taiwan is topical under this resolution is debatable, and it’s not for us to give a final answer on that. The question of whether Taiwan is, or ought to be, or can be considered as, part of the People’s Republic of China can be debated in your rounds. The famous official 1979 statement by the Carter Administration announced that the US “acknowledged” China’s view that Taiwan is part of the PRC. This is one of the most carefully crafted turns of phrase in diplomatic history, since the meaning of “acknowledging” something is certainly vague. It might mean we “understand” that China believes this (although we don’t believe it ourselves), or it might mean we “accept” that China believes it (even though we’re not sure) or it might mean we agree with it. China often advertises it as though it had the latter meaning.[[20]](#footnote-21)

The existence of Taiwan as a competing “Republic of China” has been a thorn in the side of the Communist Party on the Mainland since 1949. The KMT government, led by General Chiang Kai-shek, though opposed to communism, was no beacon of liberty and democracy. Still, until Pres. Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, US policy was dedicated to supporting and recognizing Taiwan as part of the Cold War strategy of opposing communism globally.

The policy shift towards the Mainland was made official in 1979, when Pres. Carter officially extended US diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China, with the simultaneous “unrecognition” of Taiwan as the government of China.[[21]](#footnote-22) Congress, wanting to ensure that the US did not abandon its Cold War ally, passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which declared that it was US policy “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”[[22]](#footnote-23)

In 1982, Pres. Ronald Reagan, in an attempt to overcome obstacles blocking development of closer relations with China, agreed with Chinese leaders on a written policy known as the 1982 Communique. The document promised the Mainland that the US would not increase but instead gradually reduce and ultimately eliminate arms sales to Taiwan.[[23]](#footnote-24) We thus find ourselves in the interesting position of having two conflicting policies in place at the same time: the TRA, which requires US arms sales to Taiwan, and the Communique, which says we are eliminating them.

Meanwhile, after the separation from the Mainland in 1949, Taiwan went on to develop a modern industrialized economy with large export and import trade, notably with the U.S. and Japan. Per capita GDP in Taiwan as of 2012, at $38,200, is the same as Belgium, and far higher than the Chinese mainland ($8,500).[[24]](#footnote-25)

Taiwan began developing democratic institutions and increasing respect for civil liberties after the death of Chiang Kai-shek’s son and successor, Chiang Ching-Kuo, in 1988. Taiwan had its first fully open parliamentary elections in 1992 and first directly elected president in 1996.[[25]](#footnote-26) While China wants unification with Taiwan, most Taiwanese are fearful that they would lose their economic system and political freedoms by such a move.[[26]](#footnote-27) United States policy recognizes “One China,” with Taiwan part of the “One China,” but maintains that any changes to the status quo situation with Taiwan must be negotiated peacefully and without coercion. “Not recognizing the PRC’s claim over Taiwan nor recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan’s status as unsettled. With added conditions, U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a “peaceful resolution” with the assent of Taiwan’s people and without unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome.”[[27]](#footnote-28)

Worksheet: History of US Foreign Policy with China

Name: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Answer the following in the spaces provided.

1. In the 15th century, what countries were the wealthiest in the world? Particularly for China, why did that change?

2. The Chinese refer to 1839-1949 as the “Century of Humiliation.” What item was traded with the Chinese at the time? How did this affect China’s standing in the world?

3. What power struggle occurred after the collapse of the Chinese imperial monarchy in 1911?

4. What leader arose as the Communist leader in China? Where were the militants of the KMT driven to refuge?

5. How was Mao’s communism different than the communism in the Western world? How successful was it?

6. Who came into power after Chairman Mao’s death to start China down the road to economic liberalization? What reforms did he make and how did it shift China’s standing in the world?

7. What was the American foreign policy of “containment”? How did this force a relationship with Taiwan over China?

8. What US/Taiwanese treaty pledged our loyalty to Taiwan? Chairman Mao’s first attempt to take back Taiwan was in 1958. Why didn’t he succeed? How did Mao’s relationship with the United States change in 1972?

9. How does the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 conflict with the Communique of 1982?

10. Does the US consider Taiwan part of China? Do you think an affirmative case with Taiwan would be topical in this year’s resolution? Why or why not?

Answers

1. The wealthiest countries in the world were in the East, particularly India, China and Japan. A new emperor took power in the 1430s and ended its naval exploration. China withdrew upon itself, just as Europe was about to globalize.

2. The Century of Humiliation was the timeframe when Britain forced trade of opium that intoxicated and ruined the culture of China. China had gone from the most powerful and prosperous nation in the world to a weak nation impoverished and humiliated by outsiders.

3. The power struggle was between the Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist, movement and the expelled militants that formed the Communist Party. World War 2 and the invasion of the Japanese was the reason for the cease of China’s civil war.

4. The leader that arose as the Communist leader in China after World War 2 was Chairman Mao. The militants of the KMT were driven to refuge in Taiwan.

5. Western communism focused on urban industrialization, but Mao believed that organizing rural farmers and peasants was the way forward. China’s communism failed to ignite rapid economic development, especially when compared to Taiwan or the U.S.

6. Deng Xiaoping came into power after Chairman Mao’s death. Starting in 1978, Deng began opening up to foreign trade and private enterprise, slowly abandoning the strict tenets of communism. His reforms have paid off richly for China.

7. The American foreign policy of “containment” was the doctrine that declared US foreign policy should be directed at limiting the spread of communism and “containing” it within countries that were already communist. This forced a relationship with Taiwan over China in that Taiwan was a non-communist dictatorship, not a communist republic like China.

8. The Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty pledged our loyalty to Taiwan. Mao challenged the effectiveness of the treaty by bombarding the Taiwanese-owned Quemoy and Matzu islands in August 1958. The American response was forceful, and the Soviet Union did not back China as Mao hoped. In 1972, Pres. Richard Nixon opened relations with the People’s Republic of China.

9. The TRA requires US arms sales to Taiwan. The Communique says we are eliminating them.

10. The US does not recognize the PRC’s claim over Taiwan nor recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state; US policy has considered Taiwan’s status as unsettled. Answers will vary whether or not Taiwan is a topical case.

1. US­China Smart Power Commission 2009 (chaired by former US Defense Secretary William Cohen and Maurice R.Greenberg) March 2009 "Smart Power in US­China Relations," CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. In the 1400s, nine of the ten largest cities in the world were in China. <http://webs.bcp.org/sites/vcleary/ModernWorldHistoryTextbook/Imperialism/section_3/introduction.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: Fate and Fortune in the Rise of the West, p. 48 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Asia for Educators, Columbia University <http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_imperialism.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Asia for Educators, Columbia University <http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_koreaimperialism.htm>. By the time of the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, Korea was the second-most industrialized nation in Asia after Japan itself. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/the-complicated-history-of-us-relations-with-china> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. <http://www.usni.org/store/books/history/yangtze-patrol>. As a thought experiment, imagine the Chinese Navy sending destroyers up the Mississippi River today. How would we view that? [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Also known as the « Boxer Rebellion. » <http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1999/winter/boxer-rebellion-1.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Satya J. Gabriel <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/courses/sgabriel/economics/china-essays/3.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. World Bank <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1976/01/1561165/world-bank-atlas-1976-population-capita-product-growth-rates> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. BBC <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/02/china_party_congress/china_ruling_party/key_people_events/html/deng_xiaoping.stm> [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. World Bank <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD> [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Stanton Jue, “The ‘One China’ Policy: Terms of Art,” *Foreign Service Journal*, May 2005, p .59. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson, “Mao Zedong’s Handing of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese Recollections and Documents,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (n.d.): 217-218. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson, “Mao Zedong’s Handing of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese Recollections and Documents,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (n.d.): 217-218. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. Garver, *Foreign Relations*, pp. 57-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Garver, *Foreign Relations*, p. 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1988): 199. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. <http://adst.org/2013/12/the-u-s-recognizes-communist-china-not-taiwan-january-1-1979/> quoting the Second Joint Communiqué of the US and China, 1979 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. http://www.fapa.org/chinawp/fapapress224.html [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. US State Department https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. US State Department https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. US State Department https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/china-communique [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Index Mundi http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=67 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Reuters http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/us-taiwan-election-timeline-idUSTRE7BC0E320111213 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Denny Roy, The National Interest http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/collision-course-the-looming-us-china-showdown-over-taiwan-12293 “Opinion polls show that Taiwan’s sense of a separate national identity from mainland China is increasing. While a great majority have long favored the status quo of de facto independence over immediate unification, a majority now oppose even eventual unification.“ [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Shirley Kan, Congressional Research Service https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-28)